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Can Statutory Interpleader Be Used as a
Remedy by the Tortfeasor in Mass Tort
Litigation?
1. Introduction
The proliferation of litigation in the mass tort area in recent
years poses some of the most perplexing conundrums yet faced by
the American legal system. Mass products liability litigation involves
claims and estimated future claims of millions and even billions of
dollars against defendant corporations. Juries in each of the fifty
states could all at once subject a single defendant to huge compensa-
tory damage awards.' The combined total of these discrete determi-
nations of damages may exceed the total worth of defendant corpo-
rations by billions of dollars.' The first plaintiffs to execute their
judgments may financially annihilate the assets of the corporation,
leaving nothing but an empty judgment for the thousands of other
plaintiffs litigating claims. Additionally, many products liability
cases have an inherently long fuse. A plaintiff may only discover that
he has been injured by a product thirty years after its distribution.$
These plaintiffs may be abandoned by the legal system completely if
all of the assets of defendant corporations have been exhausted to
satisfy plaintiffs who were fortunate enough to discovery their inju-
ries earlier. Thus, the present manner of dealing with compensation
for injuries suffered in a mass tort is inadequate.
I. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981) (design defect suit which resulted in an award of 2.5 million dollars in compensatory
damages and 125 million dollars in punitive damages).
2. The woes of the Johns-Manville Corporation provide a classic example of the po-
tentially far-reaching effects of mass tort litigation on a financially sound enterprise and of the
staggering amounts involved. The Manville Corporation at the time of its petition for Chapter
II bankruptcy estimated that it was defendant or co-defendant in 16,500 asbestosis-related
claims. A study estimates the minimum number of future lawsuits against Manville at 30,000.
See Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter I I Proceedings,
96 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1122 n.7 (1983). Manville filed for bankruptcy because it estimated
that tort judgments would render it insolvent. Manville had a net worth of $1.2 billion at the
time of its petition for bankruptcy. Id. at 1121 n.5.
3. The DES cases are typical examples. DES was manufactured between 1947 and
1971. Because injuries do not appear in the daughters of women who took DES until the
daughters are grown, it is uncertain how long DES-related injuries will continue to be discov-
ered. See Comment DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REv. 963, 963-67 nn. 1-17 (1978).
This comment will examine whether federal statutory inter-
pleader 4 is available for use by the tortfeasor in mass tort litigation.
This ancient equitable remedy, with its provisions for nationwide ser-
vice of process and stay of pending state court litigation, may prove
adaptable to the peculiarly modern problem of mass tort litigation.
The traditional role of equity is to act when legal remedies are
inadequate. The present lack of compensation for many plaintiffs in
mass tort litigation, and the risk to society from the extinction of
many flourishing corporations, would seem to present ideal circum-
stances for the application of equitable remedies. Yet courts have
consistently refused to permit the use of interpleader by tortfeasors.
A brief overview of the history of the remedy is necessary to explain
this refusal.
II. Interpleader, Equitable and Statutory
A. The Ancient Remedy of Interpleader
Professors Hazard and Moskovitz describe the basic model for
the interpleader remedy as follows:
A person against whom two or more persons make a claim may
4. The Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982) reads as follows:
(I) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of inter-
pleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person, firm, or corporation,
association or society having in its or his possession money or property of value
or amount of $500 or more, or providing for the delivery or payment on the loan
of money or property of such amount or value, or being under any obligation
written or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more if
(a) two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in
section 1332 of this title, are claiming, or may claim to be entitled to
such property or money, or to any one or more of the benefits arising by
virtue of any note, bond, certificate, policy or other instrument, or arising
by virtue of any such obligation; and if
(b) the plaintiff has deposited such money or property or has paid the
amount of the loan or other value of such instrument or the amount due
under such obligation into the registry of the court, there to abide the
judgment of the court, or has given bond payable to the clerk of the court
in such amount and with such surety as the court or judge may deem
proper, conditioned upon compliance by the plaintiff with the future order
or judgment of the court with respect to the subject matter of the
controversy.
(2) Such an action may be entertained although the titles or claims of the con-
flicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but are
adverse to and independent of one another.
5. See W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY § 25 (1930). See Horner v. Popham, I
Eng. Rep. 150, 152 (1697) for an interesting early example of the principle in action. In
Horner, the Chancellor granted the plaintiff an injunction for an act amounting to legal waste.
The legal waste involved irreparable injury to land. Because land is unique, the Chancellor
concluded that damages are an inadequate remedy for irreparable injury to it. Thus, equity
granted a remedy even though a legal cause of action technically existed. Of course, a legal
cause of action does exist for plaintiffs in modern mass tort cases, but the remedy actually
available, a worthless monetary award, renders the action at law inadequate. This makes it
fitting for equity to grant a remedy.
bring an action for determination whether he is liable to one or
several of the claimants, and if so to what extent, whenever: a)
the claims involve contentions of fact or contentions of mixed
law and fact, such that the plaintiff may sustain double or mul-
tiple liability as a consequence of the contentions being deter-
mine inconsistently or b) the claims may exhaust a limited fund
to which the claimants look for recovery.6
The statute which embodies the interpleader remedy, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1335 (1982), is a cumulative statute which does not abolish the old
equitable remedy.
Interpleader was originally a common law remedy used widely
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 7 It was available in a deti-
nue action to the defendant who did not know to whom he should
deliver the chattel in his possession. The remedy was narrow in
range of application, and, with the obsolescence of detinue as a form
of action, was no longer in use by the nineteenth century.8 The rules
of modern interpleader, however, derive from chancery practices of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.9 Although common law and
equitable interpleader seem to share certain common elements, the
equitable remedy is not, according to modern scholarly opinion, sub-
ject to the restrictions of the old common law remedy."° Nonetheless,
some nineteenth century ossification of equitable interpleader proce-
dures and requirements may be due to a mistaken application of
common law principles."
The earliest reported cases of interpleader derive from the mid-
seventeenth century. These cases illustrate a flexibility of form and
requirements in interpleader actions that was never to be seen
again. 12 They often involved tenants faced with conflicting claims for
6. Hazard & Moskowitz, An Historical and Critical Analysis of Interpleader, 52 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 706, 762-63 (1964). Professors Hazard and Moskowitz analyze the remedy from a
historical perspective. The starting point for any understanding of the interpleader remedy
remains the six articles on the subject by Professor Zechariah P. Chafee, Jr., who had great
influence upon the process of modernizing the remedy. See Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader,
30 YALE L.J. 814 (1924); Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685 (1924); Chafee
Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 YALE L.J. 1134, 42 YALE L.J. 41 (1932); Chafee,
Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377 (1940); Chafee, Broadening the
Second Stage of Interpleader, 56 HARV. L. REV. 541 (1943). See also, Ilsen & Sardell, Inter-
pleader in the Federal Courts, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1960).
7. See Hazard & Moskowitz, supra note 6, at 709-10. For a detailed discussion of the
common law remedy, see Rogers, Historical Origins of Interpleader, 51 YALE L.J. 924, 925-34
(1942).
8. See Hazard & Moskowitz, supra note 6, at 709 n.I I.
9. See Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, supra note 6, at 822-44 passim.
10. Id. at 830. See also Hazard & Moskowitz, supra note 6, at 709.
11. Chafee describes Vice-Chancellor Leach as "limiting his powers as a nineteenth
century Chancellor by rules laid down by common law judges in the Wars of the Roses."
Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, supra note 6, at 830. Vice-Chancellor Leach played a
prominent role in the development of the requirements for the strict bill of interpleader.
12. See. e.g., Earl of Carlisle v. Goble, 21 Eng. Rep. 739 (Ch. 1659), in which the
rent13 and debtors faced with conflicting, but apparently valid de-
mands for a specified sum of money.' During the nineteenth century
the cases took on a more commercial tinge, and the four "classic
requirements" of interpleader evolved.' 5 It is the settled opinion of
modern scholars that these requirements are largely the result of his-
torical and philosophical misunderstanding of the equitable rem-
edy.l 6 Requirements which nineteenth-century chancellors first enun-
ciated were regarded as necessary and passed into modern American
equity jurisprudence through Professor Pomeroy and Justice Story.
17
Thus, certain of the interpleader concepts that modern judges slav-
ishly quote very likely had their origin in the procedural require-
ments of an obsolete form of action. 8
Whatever the reason, interpleader evolved in the nineteenth cen-
tury into a remedy demanding four essential prerequisites. These
passed unscathed into the twentieth century as the requirements for
the so-called "strict bill of interpleader." Pomeroy identified the re-
quirements as follows:
plaintiff had had a mortgage foreclosed and lost his land to his creditor's heir. Meanwhile, the
executor of the now deceased creditor still had the bond evidencing the debt. The plaintiff
complained to the equity court that having lost the land, he now also stood liable to pay on the
bond. Sir Edward Hyde, the Lord Chancellor, "Ordered that the heir bring the Deed of Mort-
gage into Court, and that the Bond also be brought in, and that the heir should sell the land,
and bring in the money, there to remain, whilst the Executor and Heir interpleaded for the
same." It did not concern Sir Edward, as it would have a nineteenth century Chancellor, that
the things being claimed by each of the claimants, the land by the heir and the bond by the
executor, were not the same. See infra text accompanying notes 89 and 90 for a discussion of
Hackett v. Webb, 23 Eng. Rep. 141 (Ch. 1676), in which Lord Chancellor Nottingham per-
mitted the plaintiff to interplead although different debts were being claimed.
13. See, e.g., Handford v. Lloyd, 73 Selden Soc. (No. 491) (1676) in which the plain-
tiff was faced with conflicting demands for rent from the widow of the lessor and his heir. Lord
Nottingham referred to this as a "Bill in the Nature of a Bill of Interpleader," a phrase which
apparently had not acquired the technical significance it was later to have.
14. See, e.g., Corderoy's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 1233 (Ch. 1675), in which attachment of
the money of a debtor for a debt owed by his creditor to a third party rendered the plaintiff
theoretically liable to the assignee of the creditor as well as to the third party through the
attachment. The plaintiff obtained an order to reimburse him for what he had paid under the
"foreign attachment."
15. See infra text accompanying note 19.
16. See Hazard & Moskowitz, supra note 6, at 716-49 for an overview of the historical
misinterpretation and misapplication of the traditional remedy. This view corresponds to
Chafee's. See Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, supra note 6, at 831-38.
17. Both Professor Pomeroy and Justice Story criticized the doctrine that privity is
required for a bill of interpleader, but both believed erroneously that the requirement was of
venerable age and could not be excused. See 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1468
(4th ed. 1919) and 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1135 (14th ed. 1918). This doctrine
was only fourteen years old when Story unwillingly followed it in 1843. It was first mentioned
by Leach when he was master of the rolls. See Cooper v. DeTastet, 48 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ch.
1829).
18. See, e.g., Crawshay v. Thornton, 40 Eng. Rep. 541 (Ch. 1837) in which a possible
estoppel against a bailee prevented his bringing interpleader between the bailor and the right-
ful owner. This independent liability would have prevented a common law bill of interpleader.
Chafee argues that it was wrong to apply the requirement to equitable interpleader. See
Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, supra note 6, at 842-43. The case is extensively criticized
by Hazard & Moskowitz, supra note 6, at 740-44.
I) The same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by both or all
the parties against whom the relief is demanded. 2) All their
adverse titles or claims must be dependent upon or be derived
from a common source. 3) The person asking for relief-the
plaintiff-must not have or claim any interest in the subject
matter. 4) He must have incurred no independent liability to
either of the claimants; that is, he must stand perfectly indiffer-
ent between then in the position merely of a stakeholder. 9
The absence of any one of these requirements defeated the plaintiff's
request for the remedy.
20
As a result of the rigid application of the four prerequisites,
courts developed what was known as the "bill in the nature of inter-
pleader." This bill allowed the plaintiff to claim for himself an inter-
est in the matter or fund, thus obviating Pomeroy's third require-
ment. Similarly, in a bill in the nature of interpleader the plaintiff
could dispute either part or the whole of his liability to the claim-
ants.21 The only restriction on the bill was that "special equitable
grounds" had to be shown to establish a bill in the nature of inter-
pleader. Today this "special equitable grounds" requirement is satis-
fied by the showing of "multiple vexation."22 The modern federal
statute includes both strict bills of interpleader and bills in the na-
ture of interpleader.23 Thus, the plaintiff may dispute liability to the
claimants. This is of particular importance to a tortfeasor who might
want to dispute his liability.
By the early twentieth century, interpleader had been found to
be a useful remedial procedure by insurance companies, warehouse-
men and other persons and organizations faced with inconsistent ob-
ligations to two or more claimants. Its usefulness, however, was se-
verely curtailed due to the lack of some device to force claimants
who resided in different states to interplead their claims in one court.
This lamentable state of affairs was highlighted by the famous case
of New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy.24 The Dunlevy court
19. 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1322, at 906 (5th ed. 1941).
20. See, e.g., Slaney v. Sidney, 153 Eng. Rep. 699 (Ex. 1845); Fulton Bank v. Chase,
53 Hun. 634, 6 N.Y.S. 126 (1889). In Slaney, interpleader was denied because one claimant
was demanding the contract price of goods while the other was demanding reasonable value.
This did not qualify as the same debt or duty. See, e.g., Blue v. Watson, 59 Miss. 619 (1882)
for a case in which interpleader was denied because there was not privity between the
claimants.
21. See 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 22.03 (2d ed.
1984).
22. See John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326, 330 (D. Md.
1938); Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474, 480 (E.D. La. 1960). The
Pan American Court notes that "the only equitable ground necessary for interpleader . . . is
exposure to double or multiple vexation." 188 F. Supp. at 480.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1982). See supra note 4 for the full text.
24. 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
held that courts could not adjudicate the in personam claims of the
claimants against the stakeholder merely because they had in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdiction over the thing or sum that the stakeholder
had deposited in court. Because there was no way of getting in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the foreign claimant, the stakeholder faced
foreign suits after the conclusion of the interpleader proceeding.
Moreover, because federal court process did not extend beyond the
limits of the district, insurance companies found no relief in the fed-
eral courts either. Largely in response to the perceived inequity of a
remedy that could not be used against claimants residing in different
states, the first federal interpleader statute was passed in 1917.25 It
was fairly limited in scope, but did authorize insurance companies to
interplead in a federal district court when the claimants lived in dif-
ferent states. The statute also provided for nationwide service of pro-
cess. A new statute was enacted in 1926, but its inadequacies led to
the passage of the Federal Interpleader Act of 1936.26
B. The 1936 Federal Interpleader Act
Because the 1936 Act supplements the old equitable remedy,27
it is necessary to examine the statutory provisions in some detail to
determine how the statute changes the old remedy. An examination
of which elements remain from the equitable remedy is of particular
importance since there is nothing in the statute itself to prohibit the
use of interpleader by a tortfeasor. Whatever obstacles exist are
caused by the ancient equitable traditions associated with the
remedy.
1. Disputability of claims.-Under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982),
the district courts have original jurisdiction of any civil action of in-
terpleader or in the nature of interpleader.2 8 This inclusion of bills in
the nature of interpleader effectively abolishes Pomeroy's require-
ment of a disinterested stakeholder who does not dispute his liability
to the claimants. Thus, it clears the way for a tortfeasor who is not
25. For a detailed account of the evolution of today's statute, see Chafee, The Federal
Interpleader Act of 1935, supra note 6 and Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of
1936, supra note 6.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). Moore notes that the provisions of the 1936 Act have
been redistributed, but the provisions are substantially the same. 3A J. MOORE, supra note 21,
at § 22.06.
27. The equitable remedy is essentially unchanged by the statute. See Dee v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., 86 F.2d 813, 814 (7th Cir. 1938); Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v.
Gibman, 14 F.R.D. 243, 244 (D.C. Mo. 1953). In Dee the court noted, "Interpleader is a well-
established equitable remedy existing long prior to the enactment of the statute referred to.
The latter enactment did not enlarge the remedial function of the action but merely extended
the jurisdiction of federal courts."
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1982).
willing to concede liability to the claimants. Under the statute, inter-
pleader may be filed by any person, firm, corporation, association or
society that has a minimum liability of five-hundred dollars on a
note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance or other instrument, or
which is under any obligation, written or unwritten.29 The courts
have had no difficulty including tort judgments, whether liquidated
or unliquidated, within this statutory language.
30
2. "Minimal diversity."-Section 1335(a)(1) requires that
two or more adverse claimants of diverse citizenship have claimed or
potentially will claim the res3' the stakeholder wishes to deposit with
the court. 32 Early decisions under the statute did not make clear
what the diversity requirement really meant.33 In 1967 the Supreme
Court belatedly cleared up this problem by holding that the com-
plete diversity required by Strawbridge v. Curtiss34 was not a consti-
tutional requirement for interpleader jurisdiction in the federal
courts.35 Because the federal courts have a specific Congressional
grant of interpleader jurisdiction, the courts are free to require only
minimal diversity between the claimants. "Minimal diversity" means
that the citizenship of the stakeholder is irrelevant to establishment
of jurisdiction. Any two of the claimants may be from different
states to satisfy the diversity requirement. 3
3. "Pie-slicing" adversity.-The statutory requirement that
the claimants be adverse means, in the traditional interpleader set-
ting, that the claims are mutually exclusive.37 If one claimant's
rights are established, the other comes away with nothing. The tort
claims of numerous victims in a mass tort situation are not adverse
to one another in this traditional sense. In this century, however,
courts have been increasingly willing to find the adversity require-
ment satisfied by the fact that numerous plaintiffs are vying for
shares of a fund which is inadequate to satisfy all of their claims
fully.38 Finding the adversity requirement satisfied in a mass acci-
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. See. e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 532 (1967); Un-
derwriter at Lloyd's v. Nichols, 363 F.2d 357, 365 (8th Cir. 1966); Pan American Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474, 482 (E.D. La. 1960).
31. "Res," for the purpose of this comment, means a debt, duty, or obligation, whether
in the form of money, property, contract or judgment.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1982).
33. The court surveyed this problem thoroughly in Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868,
870-96 (5th Cir. 1957).
34. 7 U.S. 267 (3 Cranch) (1806).
35. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
36. Id.
37. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 863 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
38. See, e.g., Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474, 481 (E.D.
dent interpleader action brought by an insurer, one court remarked:
It might, by the same reasoning, be said that one hundred per-
sons adrift in the ocean with but one small life boat in sight
were not adverse to each other. We fear, however, that the con-
cept of nonadversity would dwindle in direct proportion to the
number of swimmers reaching the boat.
39
Numerous courts have permitted the insurer of a tortfeasor to inter-
plead under just these circumstances.' 0 Because the insurer is usu-
ally disputing liability, these are actions in the nature of inter-
pleader. 41  The independent equitable ground for equitable
jurisdiction is supplied by multiple claims to a limited fund.42 The
tortfeasor in a mass tort case could utilize this type of pie-slicing
interpleader proceeding. The tortfeasor would be disputing his liabil-
ity, and the amount of money which is or may be claimed could
exceed his assets by astronomical amounts. In State Farm and Casu-
alty Co. v. Tashire the Supreme Court specifically held that inter-
pleader proceedings may be started even though some of the claims
are not yet liquidated.'
4. Nationwide service.-Under 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1982), 4 na-
tionwide service of process is available in statutory interpleader. This
provision was the raison d'etre of the 1917 Act' 5 and would be most
useful in mass tort litigation. Process may issue from any district
court with proper jurisdiction as soon as the stakeholder has depos-
ited the res with the court or posted "such surety as the court may
deem proper.' Jurisdiction of the court only extends as far as the
La. 1960); Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 863 (S.D.
Ind. 1964); Travelers Indemnity v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 377 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1967).
39. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 863 (S.D.
Ind. 1964).
40. See supra note 38.
41. See 3A J. MOORE, supra note 21 at § 22.03.
42. Courts do not often refer to this as a special equity requirement although it appears
to be one branch of the doctrine of prevention of multiplicity of suits. See supra note 22.
43. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1982) reads as follows:
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under
section 1335 of this title, a district court may issue its process for all claimants
and enter its order restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceed-
ing in any state or United States court affecting the property, instrument or
obligation involved in the interpleader action until further order of the court.
Such process and order shall be returnable at such time as the court or judge
thereof directs, and shall be addressed to and served by the United States mar-
shals for the respective districts where the claimants reside or may be found.
Such district court shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge
the plaintiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make all
appropriate orders to enforce its judgment.
45. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1976). See General Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 553
F.2d 53, 56-57 (10th Cir. 1977). The surety must be for the largest amount possibly in contro-
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limits of the fund.47
5. Injunction against state proceedings.-Under section 2361
the court also has power to enjoin all state and federal proceedings
affecting the res in the interpleader action. This has the attractive
feature of consolidating all of the suits in mass tort litigation into a
single forum.
6. Abrogation of the "classic requirements."-The statute ex-
pressly abolishes Pomeroy's requirements of "same debt or duty and
privity."' 8 Because actions in the nature of interpleader are included
in the statute, the requirement of disinterestedness is also abolished.
The only classic requirement which may remain is the requirement
of "no independent liability," and this is unlikely to be a factor in
mass tort litigation. 9
7. Venue.-Venue provisions for statutory interpleader are de-
tailed in 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982).50 Venue is proper in the judicial
district in which any claimant resides. This provision has some omi-
nous implications for use of the remedy by a tortfeasor. Under Erie
Railroad v. Thompkins5 1 the substantive law of the state in which
the court is sitting will be used in interpleader, and under Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric2 the choice of the applicable state law is to
be governed by the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which the
court is sitting. Thus, a forum-shopping tortfeasor could control a
claimant's basic rights through selection of a forum in a state with
laws favorable to the tortfeasor's position. 3
Two other points require brief examination. Traditionally inter-
pleader proceeds in two stages. During the first stage, the stake-
holder establishes that he is entitled to the remedy, deposits the
versy. See, e.g, John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yarrow, 95 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa.
1951) in which the interpleader was granted on condition that the company deposit the
amount actually sought by the claimant.
47. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(b) (1982).
49. Most claimants would not have an independent contract with the tortfeasor, and all
would be claiming on the basis of the same conduct by the tortfeasor, for instance, selling a
defectively designed or manufactured product.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982) reads as follows: "Any civil action of interpleader or in the
nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title may be brought in the judicial district in
which one or more of the claimants reside."
51. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
52. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Klaxon was extended to interpleader proceedings in Griffin v.
McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). Moore is critical of this decision. A federal court is not sitting
in diversity when it is handling an interpleader proceeding. Consequently, there is no need for
the federal court to apply the substantive law of the forum state. See 3A J. MOORE, supra note
21, at § 22.14[5].
53. See infra notes 67 and 70 and accompanying text.
stake or bond in the court and is dismissed. 5 During the second
stage, the claimants litigate for shares of the stake.55 When the
stakeholder disputes his liability he, of course, is not discharged by
the court but remains in the proceeding to resist all or some of the
claims." This two-stage process is by no means immutable, and ad-
ditional stages could easily be added to accommodate the compli-
cated issues and claims that characterize mass tort litigation.57
Although interpleader is basically an equitable remedy, there is
no danger that use of interpleader by tortfeasors will deprive tort
victims of their constitutional right to a jury trial. Lower courts have
mandated trial by jury for traditional legal issues, such as damages
and liability, which arise in the second stage of interpleader proceed-
ings.58 The Supreme Court's decision in Beacon Theatres v. West-
over59 may have settled the matter of whether legal issues in
predominantly equitable actions must be tried to a jury. In the mass
tort area this is a desirable result. The rights of tort victims must not
be compromised by the possibility that they may be swept involunta-
rily into an equitable proceeding.
This survey of the interpleader remedy demonstrates that it has
many attractive features for the tortfeasor in mass tort litigation.
The pie-slicing type of interpleader, already in use by insurers in
mass tort litigation, serves as a model for permitting the tortfeasor to
interplead the claimants in circumstances in which it is clear that
total claims will exceed the assets of the tortfeasor. The nationwide
service of process ensures that litigation of all claims will be central-
ized in one forum. Centralization will allow the court to ensure rep-
resentation of future and unborn plaintiffs who are at present likely
54. "An action of interpleader has two separate and consecutive steps: first, the deter-
mination whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought, including discharge; and, second,
the determination of the adverse claims as between the interpleaded defendants." Pennsylvania
Ins. Co. v. Long Island Marine Supply Corp., 229 F. Supp. 186, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See
also Turman Oil Corp. v. Lathrop, 8 F. Supp. 870, 873 (N.D. Okla. 1934). These, of course,
are cases granting strict bills of interpleader.
55. See, e.g., Consolidated Underwriters of South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 136
F. Supp. 395, 397 (W.D. Ark. 1955) in which the court stated that in the second phase, "each
claimant occupies the position of a plaintiff and must establish his claim by a preponderance of
the evidence."
56. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Maloney, 85 F. Supp. 212, 215 (E.D.
Mo. 1948). This, naturally, applies only to bills in the nature of interpleader.
57. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Irwin, 82 F. Supp. 180, 182 (N.D. Ga. 1948)
in which the court contemplated a third stage to resolve liabilities of the plaintiff to claimants
if the first two stages made it necessary. See also Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, supra
note 6, at 841.
58. See, e.g., Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474, 483 (E.D.
La. 1960); John Hancock Mutual Life v. Yarrow, 95 F. Supp. 185, 188 (E.D. Pa. 1951). See
generally Comment, Jury Trial in Interpleader, 39 TEx. L. REV. 632 (1961). The older inter-
pleader cases did not permit a jury trial. See, e.g., Bynum v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D.
585, 586 (E.D.S.C. 1947).
59. 359 U.S. 500 (1977).
to be denied all relief. Furthermore, the claimants' right to a jury
trial on certain legal issues will not be jeopardized in any way by
being litigated under the general rubric of an equitable proceeding.
Despite these advantages, the case law, with a few exceptions, is
unanimous that interpleader cannot properly be granted to the
tortfeasor in mass tort litigation. Because the basis of these holdings
cannot be extracted from the statute, it must lie in traditional equi-
table precepts.
III. Obstacles to the Use of Statutory Interpleader by a Tortfeasor
A. State Farm and Casualty Co. v. Tashire
The leading case on modern interpleader is State Farm and
Casualty Co. v. Tashire.60 This benchmark case involved a collision
between a truck and a Greyhound bus which resulted in multiple
injuries. Several suits had already been filed against Greyhound, the
bus driver, the driver of the truck and the truck's owner when the
insurer of the truck driver brought an action in the nature of inter-
pleader in federal district court. State Farm had written an insur-
ance policy on the truck driver for twenty-thousand dollars per oc-
currence. In its complaint, State Farm asserted that the claims in
the actions already filed, together with those in the actions that rea-
sonably could be anticipated, would far exceed the twenty-thousand-
dollar maximum liability. State Farm asked the court to require all
claimants to establish their claims against the truck driver in this
single proceeding and to discharge State Farm from all further obli-
gations under the policy. Greyhound, originally named a defendant
in the interpleader proceeding, switched sides and asked the district
court to broaden the injunction to include the bus driver and Grey-
hound among those who could not be sued except within the confines
of the interpleader proceeding. An order was issued enjoining the
prosecution of suits against State Farm, the bus driver and Grey-
hound except within the interpleader proceeding.61 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and dissolved
the injunction, concluding that insurance companies could not invoke
federal interpleader until judgments had been obtained against the
tortfeasor.62
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that
claimants with unliquidated tort claims can be "claimants" within
the meaning of the federal interpleader statute. The Court also de-
termined that the absence of direct action statutes does not require
60. 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
61. Id. at 527.
6.2. Id. at 528.
an insurer to wait until claims against the insured have been reduced
to judgment before filing for interpleader. 63 Nonetheless, the Court
decided that the expansion of the interpleader to include the
tortfeasor exceeded the statutory grant of authority under Section
1335.6' This latter part of the holding, however, is not so decidedly
opposed to the general use of interpleader by a tortfeasor as it might
initially seem.
Tashire emphasizes that a party whose interest in the litigation
was only twenty-thousand dollars should not be able "to strip truly
interested parties of substantial rights-such as the right to choose
the forum in which to establish their claims, subject to generally ap-
plicable rules of jurisdiction, venue, service of process, removal and
change of venue."'8 5 As the Court noted, "the scope of the litigation
in terms of parties and claims was vastly more extensive than the
confines of the fund, the deposited proceeds of the insurance pol-
icy."' 66 The Court thus intimated that a party with a very small stake
in the outcome cannot control the whole array of suits arising from
an accident. The district court's order had the effect of depriving tort
plaintiffs of traditional substantial rights such as choice of forum
and its concomitant choice of applicable law. The Supreme Court
emphasized that State Farm had minimal or no interest in the out-
come of the various actions. Commenting on the typical interpleader
proceeding, the Court noted that under some circumstances, an in-
terpleader action can legitimately confine the total litigation to a sin-
gle proceeding. Such cases would occur when,
a stakeholder, faced with rival claims to the fund itself, ac-
knowledges or denies his liability to one or the other of the
claimants. In this situation the fund itself is the target of the
claimants. It marks the outer limits of the controversy. It is
therefore reasonable and sensible that interpleader, in discharge
of its office to protect the fund should also protect. the stake-
holder from vexatious and multiple litigation.67
The Court's reasoning in Tashire would not apply to a situation
in which the tortfeasor seeks interpleader relief. In such a situation,
the corporate interpleader plaintiff would not be a party with mini-
mal or no interest in the outcome of the litigation. Continued corpo-
rate existence would be at stake and the outer limits of the contro-
versy would be limited by the res which the tortfeasor would deposit
63. Id. at 529.
64. Id. at 532.
65. Id. at 536.
66. Id. at 533-34.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
with the court.6"
Nevertheless, the problem of forum shopping by the tortfeasor
would remain. Because of the interpleading plaintiff's ability to find
correct venue where any one of the claimants resides,69 the tortfeasor
would have considerable freedom to select a forum in which local
interest or applicable state law was particularly favorable to the sorts
of defenses he would want to make in the liability stage of the inter-
pleader proceeding. This would deprive claimants of the traditional
rights of tort plaintiffs to choose the forum and to be heard by a
local jury. The tortfeasor would be free to select the district court of
the district in which his plant was located as long as one of the
claimants resided there. Juries selected for the liability portion of the
proceedings might hesitate to play a role in demolishing a local in-
dustry. For these reasons, the judge would have to move the case
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens to a district court in
which the interests of the tortfeasor are less obviously involved."'
Considering the wide variety of state tort laws regarding such mat-
ters as strict products liability, it is difficult to see how a judge could
make such a decision without severely impairing the substantive
rights of individual plaintiffs or defendants. Any choice of forum
would have an adverse impact upon the substantive rights of some
plaintiffs, because their home states might have different and more
favorable laws. A better solution to this problem might be for the
liability stage of the interpleader proceedings to be conducted in
state courts. The federal judge would preside over the pie-slicing
portions of the process, using state judgments as a basis for deter-
mining prorated shares.
There are numerous ways in which the court could then appor-
tion the judgments of the state courts among the claimants. The
most equitable would be for the court to establish an interest-bearing
fund and to pay out the fund to claimants over a period of years.
This would enable future claimants to receive a just share of the
interpleaded fund long after the original claimants had begun receiv-
ing their shares. The court could require the tortfeasor to continue
paying into the fund for a specified period of years. Once the likeli-
hood of future legitimate claims becomes statistically remote, the
court could order the remaining proceeds of the fund divided up
among all of the claimants, with these shares being determined on
the same basis as were the original prorated shares.
68. Id.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) provides as follows: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought."
But one further problem is presented by the Supreme Court's
holding in Tashire. The Court set forth the following dictum that
many view as a complete bar to the use of statutory interpleader by
a tortfeasor: "We recognize that our view of interpleader means that
it cannot be used to solve all the vexing problems of multi-party liti-
gation arising out of a mass tort. But interpleader was never in-
tended to perform such a function, to be an all-purpose bill of
peace."' 71 The short and simple answer to this declaration is that in-
terpleader is not a bill of peace, nor has it ever been historically. The
use of interpleader by a tortfeasor would not render it a bill of peace,
which is a separate and distinct equitable bill with its own guiding
principles.
Bills of peace were indeed an exercise of equitable jurisdiction
based on the policy of preventing a multiplicity of suits. 72 They were
especially useful in the times before liberal joinder because equity
could handle a three-cornered lawsuit that was unadjudicable at
law. 73 One type of suit involving bills of peace was that which arose
in response to a defendant bringing successive or simultaneous ac-
tions against a plaintiff. For example, if B brought repeated actions
of ejectment against A, A would bring suit in equity by which title
was firmly established and quieted. Further actions of ejectment by
B were then enjoined. 74 Another type of suit involving bills of peace
were those in which a number of persons had separate and individual
claims against the same party, all of which arose from a common
source, were governed by the same legal rule and involved similar
facts so that the whole matter could be settled in a single suit. The
suit was brought by all of the claimants, united as co-plaintiffs, or by
one of the claimants suing on behalf of the others.75 This type of
71. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
72. See I J. POMERORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 245 (S. Symons 5th ed. 1941); W.
WALSH. A TREATISE ON EQUITY § 118 (1930).
73. Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, supra note 6, at 815.
74. 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 72, at § 246. For a discussion of the distinction between
the two types of bills of peace, see Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U.S. 533, 541-43 (1891). See also
Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15, 19 (1883) in which the court explained that
[a] bill of peace against an individual reiterating an unsuccessful claim to real
property would formerly lie only where the plaintiff was in possession and his
right had been successfully maintained. The equity of the plaintiff in such cases
arose from the protracted litigation for the possession of the property which the
action of ejectment at common law permitted. That action being founded upon a
fictitious demise, between fictitious parties, a recovery in one action constituted
no bar to another similar action or to any number of such actions. A change in
the date of the alleged demise was sufficient to support a new action. Thus, the
party in possession, though successful in every instance might be harassed and
vexed, if not ruined, by a litigation constantly renewed. To put an end to such
litigation and give repose to the successful party, courts of equity interfered and
closed the controversy.
75. See I J. POMEROY, supra note 72, at § 245. See, e.g., Chew v. First Presbyterian
Church, 237 F. 219, 221 (D.C. Del. 1919) in which the plaintiffs sued in equity on behalf of
action included suits by tenants against the lord of the manor to es-
tablish common and similar rights, or to establish the amount of
fines payable by copyhold tenants in which identical rights would
have to be settled in numerous individual suits.76 Thus, bills of peace
were either proceedings to quiet title or a sort of proto-class action
suit. The distinction between this type of proceeding and an inter-
pleader proceeding in mass tort litigation is obvious. Tort liability to
individuals can never be decided equitably in one trial. In the true
bill of peace proceeding, the parishioners are all liable to the parson
for a fixed amount of tithes, and they will be assessed in the same
manner upon every household." Conversely, with plaintiffs in mass
tort litigation, there may be sufficient commonalty to permit limited
use of class certification for certain selected issues, 78 but compensa-
tory damages must be ascertained on an individual basis. Each indi-
vidual's injury in unique from that of his fellow victims. As a result,
courts have been very reluctant to permit class action suits in mass
tort litigation. 79 At some point, the centralized proceeding would in-
evitably disintegrate into numerous individual lawsuits. The advan-
tage which the pie-slicing type of interpleader offers over a class ac-
tion suit is that the flexibility of the second stage of interpleader
would permit individual adjudication of damages.
The Supreme Court's dictum that interpleader is not intended
to operate as an all-purpose bill of peace, then, does not bar the pro-
cedure's use by a tortfeasor. The Court's statement is much more
themselves and others to restrain a church from entering on the vaults and burial lots where
their relatives were buried. The defendants intended to sell the cemetary. See also Pen-
nefeather v. Baltimore Steam-Packet Co., 58 F. 481, 484 (C.C.D.Md. 1893) in which owners
of goods that had been destroyed were permitted to sue on behalf of themselves and others to
avoid a multiplicity of suits and to make a proper apportionment of the recovery.
76. See, e.g., Cowper v. Clerk, 24 Eng. Rep. 1010, 1011 (1732); Powell v. Powis, 148
Eng. Rep. 627, 630 (1826). In Cowper, a single copyholder brought a bill to be relieved of an
excessive fine. The Lord Chancellor denied the bill but asserted that a bill would lie to settle a
general fine to be paid by all the copyhold tenants of a manor. In Powis, freehold tenants of
the Earl of Powis, who enjoyed rights of common for their cattle levant and couchant and
common of turbary and estover brought a bill of peace when the lord granted parts of the
common to others. The Lord Chief Baron refused to allow a demurrer to the bill stating that
"lilt is no objection to this bill, that the defendants may each have a right to make a separate
defence, provided there be only one general question to be settled which pervades the whole."
Powis, 148 Eng. Rep. at 630 (emphasis added).
77. See cases cited in I J. POMEROY, supra note 72, § 247, at 469 n. 1.
78. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 386 (D. Mass. 1975) (conditional
certification of class of women exposed to DES in utero on thirteen selected issues); Hernandez
v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (issue of liability for food poisoning
on a cruise ship certified), affld mem., 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975).
79. See, e.g., Abed v. A. H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982) (vacating
class certification on a finding that a limited fund did not inescapably exist); Yandle v. P.P.G.
Industries, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 571 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (denying class certification because
different damage and liability issues existed for each plaintiff individually). The Yandle court
noted that "there is not a single act of negligence or proximate cause which would apply to
each potential class member and each defendant in this case." 65 F.R.D. at 571.
pertinent to class action suits than it is to interpleader actions. As
claimants in an interpleader proceeding, tort plaintiffs would not be
forced to litigate their claims as a class, as they would in a bill of
peace proceeding. Claims would be individually litigated, 80 . and the
plaintiffs would then receive prorated shares of the deposited fund.
Furthermore, the tortfeasor would not be in the position of the insur-
ance company in Tashire, a party with little or no stake in the out-
come of the whole litigation, whose control of the underlying litiga-
tion the Court found so offensive to traditional notions of fairness.
In support of the Court's contention that interpleader should not
be an all-purpose bill of peace, the Court noted that the legislative
history of the 1936 Act shows no sign of a congressional intention to
establish interpleader as a bill of peace."1 This is true. 2 The Court
further noted that Professor Chafee had not included interpleader
actions in his section on bills of peace in his treatise on equity. 3 In
fact, Professor Chafee in his first article on interpleader recom-
mended reform and modernization of the remedy and observed that
with reform,
interpleader will no longer be a distinctive branch of equity, but
really only one species of a bill of peace, if we extend that name
to all suits where relief is asked from a multiplicity of actions at
law without adequate possibility of justice in the law courts. If
the benefits of settling the matter by one proceeding in equity
outweigh the difficulties of combining numerous parties and
claims, then equity should act.84
B. The Plaintiff Who has Misbehaved
The next obstacle to the use of statutory interpleader by the
tortfeasor is the repeated statement in the case law that a tortfeasor
cannot obtain protection through interpleader against the conse-
quences of his own wrong. The sources of this statement seem to be
the following: (1) the equitable tradition that equity will not save
someone from his own mistake, and (2) the quite distinct equitable
doctrine of clean hands.85
The ultimate source of the equitable tradition that a stakeholder
seeking an interpleader action should not be responsible for creating
80. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
81. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 535 n.17 (1967).
82. See S. REP. No. 558, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
83. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 535 n.17 (1967).
84. Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, supra note 6, at 844.
85. See, e.g., Royal Neighbors of America v. Lowry, 46 F.2d 565 (D. Mont. 1931);
Calloway v. Miles, 30 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir. 1929).
the underlying claims may be the case of Hackett v. Webb, 86 decided
in 1676 by Lord Chancellor Finch. Although the proceeding is not
called interpleader in that case, interpleader is clearly what took
place. The plaintiff had been asked by Webb to demand one-hundred
pounds from Pitts. Pitts paid the money with a bond providing that
if it appeared the money was not really owed to Webb, the money
would be repaid to Pitts. Pitts died before he had adjusted accounts
with Webb who sued the plaintiff for the one-hundred pounds. Like-
wise, the administrator of Pitts' estate sued Hackett on the bond.
The plaintiff instituted a bill to whom he should pay the money and
deposited the money with the court. The Chancellor decreed an ac-
count and, "in Regard that the Plaintiff had behaved himself well,"
ordered the bond cancelled and a permanent injunction against fur-
ther lawsuits in the matter. 87 It is apparent that this is a classic in-
terpleader situation. The plaintiff was faced with inconsistent de-
mands which could have resulted in double liability. Significantly,
the Lord Chancellor did not state that the plaintiff must have be-
haved himself well in order for interpleader to have been granted.
Some interesting facets of the development of the "good behav-
ior" doctrine appear in cases in which interpleader was refused.
"Good behavior" apparently does not mean that the interpleader
plaintiff cannot be a tortfeasor or criminal. It seems to mean, rather,
that he cannot have made a mistake, in the simplest, non-legal sense
of the word. Connecticut Mutual Life v. Tucker"8 presents a typical
example. The case involved an insurance policy originally issued by
Connecticut Mutual to Pinkham. The policy was payable to Pink-
ham's wife, but she assigned all her interest to her husband. He noti-
fied the company of this assignment and requested that the company
reissue the policy to indicate that it was to be paid into Pinkham's
estate. The company issued the new policy. After Pinkham's death,
however, a court battle ensued between Pinkham's children, who
were claiming under the first policy, and purported assignees of
Pinkham's interest in the reissued policy. The court refused to grant
interpleader to the company because,
by issuing the two policies the complainant has exposed itself to
claims under both, and must meet them as best it can. If the
complainant created a new liability upon itself by issuing a sec-
ond policy without obtaining a sufficient discharge from the
original policy, it would be its own fault.89
86. 23 Eng. Rep. 141 (Ch. 1676).
87. Hackett, 23 Eng. Rep. at 142.
88. 23 R.I.1, 49 A. 26 (1901).
89. Id. at 2, 49 A. at 27-28.
The court concluded that "the complainant cannot have an order
that the respondents be forced to interplead when one important
question to be tried is whether by reason of its own act it is under
different liabilities to more than one of these respondents. '" 90
It is clear that the denial of interpleader relief in this case was
not based upon any sort of moral fault in the insurance company.
The court held that the insurance company created its own dilemma
by issuing the two policies and that a court of equity would not bail
the company out because of the company's own mistaken handling of
the matter. The court was not holding that Connecticut Mutual was
a dishonest or blameworthy middleman and did not address the issue
of the culpability of a plaintiff-tortfeasor. Nor did it address the is-
sue of whether that culpability would bar him from being granted
the interpleader remedy. Yet this case is cited for the proposition
that a tortfeasor is not eligible for the remedy of interpleader. 91
The court used similar reasoning in Calloway v. Miles.92 In
Calloway the widow of the policyholder and the administrator of the
policyholder's estate were claiming from the insurance company.
The court determined that the company was not entitled to the rem-
edy because,
the company knew its rights or should have known them ....
The plaintiff wittingly placed itself in this situation, and equity
cannot relieve it at the expense of these claimants. If plaintiff
brought this new liability on itself, it is its own fault and it must
protect itself as best it can.93
Once again, the reason for refusal was the carelessness of a would-be
plaintiff in incurring two separate liabilities.
The sort of fault which barred the insurance companies from
interpleader in Calloway and Connecticut Mutual is different from
that which is alleged against a defendant in tort litigation.94 The
tortfeasor cannot reasonably know to which of the plaintiffs he
should pay the limited amount of money available. On the other
90. Id. at 4, 49 A. at 28.
91. Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960) is the
leading "pie-slicing" interpleader case. For the proposition that "clean hands" applies to inter-
pleader proceedings the Pan American Court cites Calloway v. Miles, 30 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir.
1930). See Pan American 188 F. Supp. at 481 n.30. The Calloway Court, in turn, cites Con-
necticut Mutual Life v. Tucker, 23 R.I. 1, 49 A.26 (1901). Calloway, 30 F.2d at 14-15. From
this lineage springs the full-blown confusion in modern interpleader cases about the three dis-
tinct equitable principles of clean hands, laches, and that equity will not aid a person who has
caused his own problem.
92. 30 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1929).
93. Id. at 16.
94. See also Jax Ice and Coal Storage Co. v. South Florida Farms Co., 91 Fla. 593,
109 So. 212 (1926) for another case in which the court held that a complainant is not entitled
to interpleader if he should know the person to whom he has an obligation.
hand, the courts have held insurance companies to knowledge of the
contracts which they themselves wrote. Usually, the tortfeasor has
not been trying to create any relationship at all with claimants.
There is no analogy between the insurance company foul-ups and the
corporation which markets a product that turns out to be dangerous.
Even if a manufacturer in a products liability case had no knowledge
and no reason to know that the product was defective, it may be held
strictly liable. No fault or negligence of any type need be involved in
order to render it a tortfeasor. 95 Consequently, the tortfeasor has not
willingly and wittingly placed itself in a bad position, nor does it
know its own rights and obligations, nor should it know them as the
insurance companies in Calloway and Connecticut Mutual should
have. Yet Calloway and Connecticut Mutual are the types of cases
that are cited in support of the conclusion that tortfeasors may not
use interpleader proceedings. Actually, the cases seem to stand for
the very different proposition that the would-be interpleader plaintiff
cannot evade a contractual liability by bringing interpleader. It
should, however, be noted that the case law is not totally against the
proposition that the tortfeasor may be at least joined with the insurer
in bringing the interpleader.
C. The Case Law
In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Ahrens,9" a case involving
numerous incidents of infectious hepatitis allegedly caused by the in-
gestion of raw oysters at a restaurant in Houston, the tortfeasors
were included provisionally in the interpleader proceeding. Signifi-
cantly, although it expanded its injunction to include all pending
state and federal litigation concerning the matter,9 the court was
careful to point out that the jurisdiction of the court extended only
as far as the deposited fund.98 The practical effect of this jurisdic-
tional limitation was that after the conclusion of the interpleader,
the claimants could seek further compensation from the remaining
assets of the tortfeasor in subsequent state court actions. Thus, the
effect of including the tortfeasor in the proceeding was virtually can-
celled out. Moreover, Aetna Casualty presented many unique factual
features which render its precedential value quite limited. 9
95. For a history of the development of strict tort liability for manufacturers, see
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965). Professor Wade defines
"'strict liability" as "liability imposed on a manufacturer of a chattel because of an injury
caused to plaintiff or his property by the condition of the chattel without regard to the pres-
ence or absence of his negligence." Id. at 5.
96. 414 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
97. Id. at 1242.
98. Id. at 1254.
99. The defendants were allegedly insolvent so the tort plaintiffs were anxious that they
A case perhaps more useful as precedent to support a
tortfeasor's interpleader action is Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
100
In prior litigation, Aetna had been accused of conversion of bonds
used in the purchase of annuities. The court nonetheless permitted
Aetna to bring an interpleader action against the extremely numer-
ous claimants to the fund. The court reasoned that
[wihile the position of the appealing defendants has been
throughout that Aetna converted or participated in the conver-
sion of the bonds belonging to Rosa B. Wright Rettenmeyer and
that it has not acted in good faith in instituting the action, the
cause has not been tried and there has not been a finding or
determination of tort on the part of Aetna or any lack of good
faith on its part in instituting the action. And unless or until
such issues have been tried, the contentions presently presented
on appeal are premature.'01
The court would seem to be opening the door to admitting into inter-
pleader an alleged tortfeasor against whom nothing has been proven.
Admittedly, however, the Holcomb decision seems to be unique in
the case law.
D. The Doctrine of Clean Hands in Equity
The maxim that equity will not extend relief to a party against
the consequences of his own mistake is not particularly appropriate
to the situation in which a tortfeasor tries to interplead. Nonetheless,
because interpleader is an equitable proceeding, traditional equitable
doctrines will apply. 102 Foremost among the doctrines that have
barred access to interpleader relief to tortfeasors is the doctrine of
"clean hands." The doctrine is sometimes stated, "He that hath
committed inequity shall not have equity.' a03 As Professor Pomeroy
noted, the maxim is not the foundation of any equitable estate or
interest. It is rather a universal rule guiding the action of equity
courts.104
be included in the interpleader proceeding. Id. at 1246.
100. 228 F.2d 75 (10th Cir. 1955).
101. Id. at 82.
102. See Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Ingram, 560 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1977).
103. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 19, §§ 397-99. See also Annot., 4 A.L.R. 44, 62 (1919);
W. WALSH, supra note 6, at § 53.
104. See 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 19, at § 404. The Supreme Court has stated that the
clean hands doctrine "is rooted in the historical concept of court of equity as a vehicle for
affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith." Precision Instrument
Mfg. Co. v. Automatic Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945). Professor
Chafee took a more cynical view of the doctrine, arguing that far from being hoary with age it
is only about 250 years old. Professor Chafee believed that the doctrine has been confusingly
applied in modern cases. See Chafee Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REv.
877, 880 (1949).
The action of a court of equity is fundamentally discretionary,
and the theory is that equity does not involve itself with a would-be
plaintiff whose own conduct in the matter is unconscionable or in
bad faith.10 5 The Supreme Court has summarized the doctrine as
follows:
A court of equity acts only when and as conscience commands,
and if the conduct of the plaintiff be offensive to the dictates of
natural justice, then whatever may be the rights he possesses
and whatever use he may make of them in a court of law, he
will be held remediless in a court of equity. 100
Nonetheless, there are certain important limitations upon this doc-
trine. It does not apply to any unconscionable or bad faith conduct of
the would-be plaintiff outside the subject matter of the suit.10 7 Eq-
uity will not refuse aid to a bad man or a criminal as long as his
conduct in the matter at hand has been acceptable. 0 This would
mean that the defendant claimants in an interpleader action would
have to show that the plaintiff-tortfeasor is culpable in some way
connected with the mass tort litigation. This may not be as easy to
accomplish as it seems at first glance.
In the typical strict product liability suit, the plaintiff does not
have to show any actual culpability or fault on the part of the de-
fendant in manufacturing or marketing its product. 109 Rather than
have to show that the defendant actually knew or should have known
that his product was dangerously defective, plaintiffs are permitted
to impose on the defendant a "constructive knowledge" of the de-
105. See, e.g., Bodly's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch. 1679) which bears the heading,
"'Iniquity takes away Equity." In Bodly, an Oxford student had given a bond of 500 pounds to
the defendant to maintain the latter's sister and a base-born child and to pay 50 pounds to
defendant's sister directly. There was no mention in the bond of where the money should be
paid. The plaintiff offered to pay the money into the court and sought an injunction against
suit at law on the bond. The defendant answered that the plaintiff had seduced his sister and
refused to marry her. Despite the plaintiff's assertion that he had been encouraged to woo the
sister by her father, the Lord Chancellor refused to grant the injunction to prohibit the suit at
law because of the plaintiff's bad actions in the transaction.
106. Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 390 (1896).
107. See 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 19, at § 399. See also the Supreme Court's state-
ment in Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933):
But courts of equity do not make the quality of suits the test. They apply the
maxim of requiring clean hands only where some unconscionable act of one com-
ing for relief has immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks in
respect of the matter in litigation. They do not close their doors because of plain-
tiff's misconduct, whatever its character, that has no relation to anything in-
volved in the suit, but only for such violations of conscience as in some measure
affect the equitable relations between the parties in respect of something brought
before the court for adjudication.
108. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Co. v. Bay, 138 F. 203, 207-08 (3d Cir. 1905) in which the
plaintiff's membership of in an illegal combination to fix ticket prices did not disqualify it from
getting an injunction to restrain defendant from ticket scalping.
109. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 95 (4th ed. 1971).
fect. 1 ° This has the obvious advantage of short-circuiting the very
difficult proof problems of a plaintiff trying to prove that a product
was negligently manufactured."' Nonetheless, modern products lia-
bility cases at least potentially leave open the issue of whether the
tortfeasor was in any way morally a wrongdoer. The resolution of
this issue is critical to the availability of equitable proceedings.
The only way a court sitting in equity could determine this issue
would be on a case-by-case basis. The court would need to consider
what had been alleged and proven against the tortfeasor and, in par-
ticular, whether actual negligence or intent had ever been proven. In
a case such as Abbott v. Sindell,1 2 in which the plaintiff was not
even required to show causation, it would be difficult to say that
"clean hands" should bar the tortfeasor's application for interpleader
relief."' On the other hand, the conduct of the A. H. Robins Com-
pany in the various Dalkon Shield cases has raised serious questions
about the moral culpability of the company. For example, evidence
was produced that Robins falsified its marketing literature and con-
cealed from the Food and Drug Administration the fact that Dalkon
Shields contained copper." 4 The bottom line seems to be that "clean
hands" would sometimes bar interpleader to a tortfeasor at the
court's discretion, but in other situations could not justly be invoked.
Because equitable jurisdiction is fundamentally discretionary, per-
mitting a judge to make this type of determination about moral cul-
pability before permitting interpleader would be a natural applica-
tion of normal equitable principles.
Thus, the "plaintiff as author of his own mistake" and "clean
hands" doctrines would not, theoretically, bar the tortfeasor in mass
tort litigation from entitlement to interpleader relief. Many modern
judges have misapprehended the significance of these equitable
maxims.
E. The Limited Fund Requirement
The one remaining theoretical obstacle to the use of inter-
pleader by the tortfeasor is the problem of the limited fund. As
noted earlier, it is a statutory prerequisite to the granting of inter-
110. See. e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood, 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
111. Numerous other valid policy reasons can be cited to support the idea. See generally
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114-24 passim (1969).
112. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
113. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court noted that "[firom a
broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able to bear the cost of injury from the manu-
facture of a defective product." This is a far cry from saying that the defendants were morally
culpable.
114. See Comment, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Effi-
ciency, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1180, 1184 nn. 17-18 (1983).
pleader that the res in controversy, whether money, property, or a
surety for its value, must be deposited with the court.1 5 Moreover,
depositing the fund, along with meeting the various traditional and
statutory requirements for interpleader relief, triggers the court's ju-
risdiction." 6 Although no conceptual objections exist to the notion
that a fund is "limited" by the extent of the tortfeasor's assets, nu-
merous practical objections do exist.
Because the multiple claims upon a limited fund establish the
special equity necessary for a pie-slicing interpleader,1 7 a tortfeasor
is clearly in an analogous position to an insurance company which is
being asked to satisfy many claims out of a limited stake. The satis-
faction of a comparatively few judgments by the tortfeasor may im-
pair or totally preclude the recovery of other plaintiffs if those judg-
ments put the tortfeasor out of business. Unlike the insurer, the
liability of the tortfeasor is theoretically unlimited. If he has one
stick of furniture left at the office, it can be levied to satisfy a judg-
ment. Hence, the only way the tortfeasor can satisfy the requirement
that the res in dispute must be deposited in court is to give surety for
all of its corporate assets to the court. Should the court determine
that less than all of the assets of the corporation would suffice to
establish the interpleader jurisdiction,and it is difficult to see what
the rationale for this could be, an additional difficulty would arise.
The in personam jurisdiction of the court extends only as far as the
limits of the fund."1 " In effect, unless the court had all of the corpo-
rate assets deposited, it would have no power to prevent subsequent
suits in other fora. This, in turn, would defeat the entire purpose of
the interpleader. Claimants would no longer be forced to accept a
prorated share of the same pie. While the courts have shown some
flexibility on the limited fund issue, their flexibility has extended
only to permitting the plaintiff to deposit the largest amount possibly
in dispute." 9
Because nothing less than all of the corporate assets would suf-
fice to satisfy the statutory requirement, it is difficult as a practical
matter to see what advantage a tortfeasor might obtain in seeking
interpleader relief. The more prudent path might be to litigate indi-
vidual claims and hope to settle enough of them to keep the corpora-
tion financially viable. This would be terribly inefficient both socially
and economically. Another route might be Chapter 11
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(b)(1) (1982).
116. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 637 (D. Kan. 1968).
117. See supra note 22.
118. See U.S. v. Major Oil Corp., 583 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 1978); Knoll v. So-
cony Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d 425, 429 (10th Cir. 1966).
119. See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yarrow, 95 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa.
1951).
bankruptcy. 20
Clearly, Congress should devise a statutory means by which in-
terpleader might, under well-delineated conditions, be granted to a
tortfeasor without the requirement that all of the corporate assets be
interpleaded. Congress would need to establish specific guidelines for
federal judges to use in determining whether the social and economic
consequences that would follow from the total annihilation of the
tortfeasor would outweigh the competing social objective of compen-
sating tort claimants as fully as possible. The guidelines would need
to be so precise that they would be almost mechanical in application.
Wide-ranging social and economic speculation are inherently un-
suited to judicial examination and determination.2 1
IV. Conclusion
The ancient remedy of interpleader is well-suited in many im-
portant respects to modern mass tort litigation. It offers nationwide
service of process and the right to jury trial on appropriate issues. It
could provide an equitable allocation of limited funds to the numer-
ous claimants in mass tort litigation. In many mass tort cases, the
tortfeasor has been adjudged liable but has not been determined to"
be morally culpable. In such cases neither the ancient equitable
maxim that equity will not protect a person from the consequences
of his own mistakes nor the clean hands doctrine would bar a
tortfeasor from seeking relief in an interpleader proceeding. While
satisfaction of the statutory limited fund requirement may be theo-
retically possible, it offers few incentives for the tortfeasor, which
would have to surrender its entire corporate assets as the fund from
which shares would be allocated. An amendment of 28 U.S.C. §
1335 (1982) permitting judges to determine whether fewer than all
of the corporate assets would suffice for the limited fund requirement
would be a desirable solution for tortfeasor and claimants alike.
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